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An Analysis of Wealth Change of Acquiring-firm Shareholders in the Recent Technology 
Mergers Wave in U.S. 
by 
ShuJing Zhang 
October 23, 2015 
This paper examines the experience of acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth during recent 
technology merger wave in U.S. from 2010 to 2014. The methodology in this paper uses 
635 acquisitions from the high-tech industry over the period 2010 to 2014. The mean 
cumulative abnormal return and aggregate dollar return are used to measure the yearly 
wealth change of acquirer shareholders. The paper finds that large loss and gain deals lead 
to different results of acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth change in the same year. In 
addition, the paper examines the impact of relative firm and deal characteristics on the 
results. The findings show that these characteristics contribute limitedly to abnormal 
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Mergers and acquisitions activities play important roles in businesses. Acquiring firms try 
to achieve further development for the firms and wealth increase for shareholders through 
those acquisition activities. Since 2010, a wave of technology M&A activities started in 
U.S with great impact on the internet. According to data from Bloomberg, the number of 
acquisitions over period 2010 to 2014 increased from 599 to 693, while aggregate value 
of acquisitions increased from 30 billion to 42.6 billion. Companies from various 
industries are participating in this wave. The technology companies with large market 
capitalization are willing to acquire those newly created firms with unique patent 
techniques to reduce research and development expenses and maintain relatively high 
growth. Other companies from traditional industries acquire associated technology 
companies to hedge against challenges created by high technology by improving products, 
services and management system. Although these acquisition activities helped benefits 
for some company operations, not all acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth achieved a net 
benefit from these acquisitions. 
The change in acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth after acquisition has been studied in 
many ways. Most frequently, abnormal return is used to measure change of 




1990s by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) point out that a large aggregate dollar 
loss will occur even though the mean abnormal returns in the period surrounding 
acquisition announcements is positive.  
Figure 1.1 
Yearly aggregate dollar return of acquiring-firm shareholders (1980-2001) 
 
Source: Wealth destruction on a massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in recent merger 
wave, Moller, Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, 2005, Journal of Finance 2, 
757-782. 
The aggregate dollar returns is defined as the sum of the changes in the acquiring firm’s 
capitalization over 3 days surrounding acquisition announcements date. From Figure 1.1, 
we can estimate that the aggregate dollar returns from 1998 to 2001 are all large loss; 
despite the mean abnormal returns for acquisition announcements in these years being 




small number of extremely large loss deals with negative average abnormal return. 
Figure 1.2 
Yearly aggregate dollar return of technology acquiring-firm shareholders 
(2010-2014) 
 
Source: Wealth destruction on a massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in recent merger 
wave, Moller, Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, 2005, Journal of Finance 2, 
757-782. 
Then, many firm and deal characteristics are found to be significant to explain the low 
acquiring-firm abnormal returns which exist in large dollar loss deals in researches. For 
firm characteristics, lower acquiring-firm abnormal returns often occur when firms have 
low leverage (Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993)), large capitalization (Moeller 
et al. (2004)). For deal characteristics, Chang (1998), and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
(2002) point out acquisitions of public have lower acquiring-firm abnormal returns. Other 
















acquisitions, and the relation between the target and the acquiring firm, have also been 
proved to affect the acquiring-firm’s abnormal returns. 
In recent U.S. technology mergers wave, I find that the acquiring-firm shareholders get 
an average dollar gain of 35million with negative mean abnormal return in 2011. And a 
large dollar loss took place with positive mean abnormal return in 2012. Figure 2 
illustrates the yearly aggregate dollar return of acquiring-firm shareholders for sample 
acquisitions of public or private firms in technology industry from 2010 through 2014 in 
U.S. We can also find that yearly aggregate dollar returns in these five years changed 
with high volatility. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth over the 
past 5 years and figure out whether there exist large loss deals that may cause losses to 
the acquiring-firm shareholders. The paper will also try to determine whether firm and 
deal characteristics contribute to the low abnormal returns in large loss deals. 
1.2 Structure of the Research 
The first section is an introduction the issue of acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth. In 
Chapter 2, the literature review on the change of acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth is 
provided. Then Chapter 3 will deal with data source and the methodologies used to 
measure the wealth change of technology acquiring-firm shareholders. It will also present 
some firm and deal characteristics and related hypothesis. In Chapter 4, the contents will 
offer the specific results of the wealth change and analysis possible reason of above 







Considerable researches have been documented on returns to acquiring-firm shareholders 
over the past decades when mergers and acquisitions market became hot (Healy, Palepu, 
and Ruback, 1992; Servaes, 1994; Loughram and Vijh, 2005). 
First of all, the studies have suggested two measurements to capture the wealth changes 
to acquiring-firm shareholders, normally, the abnormal percentage return and the 
abnormal dollar return. The abnormal percentage return is the measurement that most 
studies focus on. In the research of Brown and Warner (1985), they state the standard 
event study methodologies using daily stock returns data to generate abnormal returns 
and relative tests. They also state that standard procedures are typically well-specified 
even when special daily data characteristics are ignored. On the other hand, Malatesta 
(1983) points out that the appropriate measure of the wealth effect is the 
abnormal dollar return cumulated over time. His evidence also reveals that measured 
abnormal rates of return to acquiring firms are influenced by firm size, with smaller firms 
realizing significantly negative post-merger returns. In practice, the mean abnormal 
returns and the aggregate dollar returns will offer opposite opinions on wealth change of 
acquiring-firm shareholders as the study by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) 
noted. Their study proves that few large dollar loss deals associated with low abnormal 




return. This paper will examine the sample using both measurements to confirm the 
wealth change of acquiring-firm shareholders and investigate the disparity between two 
measurements if exist. 
Furthermore, the factors affecting abnormal return have been widely and deeply studied. 
As the returns of acquisition reflect the value of the acquisition itself and the influence 
made by acquirer on the deal, both firm and deal characteristics are appropriate and 
important to explain the abnormal return of acquisition.  
Among firm features, low Tobin’s q of acquiring firm is found to lead to lower abnormal 
return in study by Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) and Servaes (1991). These two 
researches propose that shareholders of high q acquirers gain significantly more than the 
shareholders of low q acquirers. However, the researches of Dong et al. (2003) and 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) are against previous statement about Tobin’s q. 
The study by Moeller et al. (2004) also suggest that the abnormal return for 
acquiring-firm shareholders is higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of 
financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private, which means acquiring firms 
with large capitalization have lower abnormal return.  
Other important firm features, such as financial leverage and cash, are also discussed in 
the literature. Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) note that debt improves 
managerial decision making. Announcement-period acquirer returns are greater the 




the bidder is cash-rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance 
because of cash-rich firms’ more diversifying acquisitions and less attractive targets. 
Some reports investigated the effects from acquiring firms’ management to abnormal 
return. Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) support the proposition that managerial 
welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns of acquiring firms, from the 
time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are 
positively related to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior 
management of the acquirer. And Malmendier and Tate (2003) prove that overconfident 
CEOs overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. Therefore, 
market reaction at merger announcement is significantly more negative than for 
acquisitions decided by non-overconfident CEOs.  
For deal properties, status of targets and payment methods of the acquisition are found to 
influence percentage returns. Chang (1998) concludes that in stock offer, bidders 
experience a positive abnormal return, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return 
typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002) confirm that when the target is a private firm or a subsidiary of a 
public firm, bidding firm shareholders usually gain. And the method of payment chosen 
in a takeover is partially a function of characteristics of the target. In earlier time, Travlos 
(1987) also provide evidences revealing significant differences in the abnormal returns 
between common stock exchanges and cash offers. Payment method of equity offer 




The strategies chosen in acquisition relate to acquirer shareholders’ return, either. A 
hostile takeover results lower acquiring-firm shareholders abnormal return empirically 
proved by Schwert (2000), because gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing 
incumbent managers which may not happen after acquisition.  
As mentioned in analysis of cash-rich companies before, diversifying acquisitions made 
by acquiring firm lead to poorer abnormal return (Harford (1999)). The study Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) also indicates that conglomerate acquisitions have 
systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding 
firms. 
Some theories examined competitions in acquisitions and the relative size of the target to 
the bidder. Bradley et al. (1988) provide a theoretical analysis of the process of 
competition for control of the target and empirical evidence that competition among 
bidding firms increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers.  And 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find out that bidders' abnormal returns are positively 
related to the relative size of the merger partners. 
Finally, the paper will investigate firm and deal characteristics discussed above based on 
current data, especially the characteristics which contain different conclusions in popular 








Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
The paper focuses on the effect of acquisitions on changes in the wealth of acquiring 
firms to evaluate shareholders. Some criteria of sample acquisitions are set based on the 
criteria in the study about performance of acquisitions for acquiring-firm shareholders by 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005). The investigated samples of acquisitions are 
constructed from Bloomberg’s Database. The sample deals have to meet the following 
criteria: 
1. The announcement date is in the 2010 to 2014 period; 
2. The target is a U.S public firm or private firm in technology industry; 
3. The acquirer is a U.S public firm, or private firm; 
4. Data on the acquirer is available from CRSP and COMPUSTAT; 
5. The acquirer controls less than 50% of the shares of the target at the announcement 
date and obtains 100% of the target shares if the target is a public or private firm. 
6. The deal value is equal to or greater than $1 million; 
7. The deal value is greater than 1% of the market value of the assets of acquiring firm. 
The market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity; and 




Table 1 presents the specific distribution of sample acquisitions in each year.  
Table 3.1 
Distribution of sample in each year 
Year Total Tech M&A Sample Size 
2010 599 140 
2011 590 138 
2012 663 134 
2013 655 105 
2014 693 118 
All 3200 635 
 
3.2 The Abnormal Return and the Dollar Return 
The wealth change of acquiring-firm shareholders is measured in two methods in this 
paper: the abnormal return and the dollar return.  
The abnormal returns, which the paper follows standard event study methods (Brown and 
Warner (1985)) to estimate, describe the wealth change in percentage. The estimated 
market model is assumed as: 
    𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Abnormal returns are defined as the market residuals. The event window is set from day 
-2 to day +1relative to announcement date. The paper uses 3-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR (-1, +1)) to measure the performance of sample acquisition for 
acquiring-firm shareholders. The parameters in the models are estimated in estimation 
window as (-205, -6) day interval. In this market model, the data for 𝑅𝑀 are equally 




period returns of those acquiring firms. All the data come from The Center for Research 
in Security Prices Database (CRSP). The time-series and cross-sectional variations of 
abnormal returns have been tested. 
The dollar return is another effective measurement to capture acquiring-firm shareholders’ 
wealth changes based on market capitalization of acquiring firm. Compared to the 
abnormal returns, the dollar returns make acquiring-firms shareholders’ wealth changes 
correspond to related acquiring firms’ market capitalization (Malatesta (1983)). The 
shareholders of large firms will loss or gain more than whom of small firms when facing 
the same abnormal returns.  
As the event window is day -2 to day +1relative to announcement date, the paper defines 
the acquisition dollar return as the change in market capitalization during event window. 
The dollar returns in this paper, computed using the U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
Deflator, are all in 2014 dollars. The sum of acquisition dollar returns in each year is the 
yearly technology industry aggregate dollar return. A value weighted return is equal to the 
sum of the acquisitions dollar returns divided by the sum of the equity capitalizations two 
days before acquisition announcements. The yearly aggregate dollar return can also be 
defined as the sum of the product of the cumulative abnormal return in of each 
announcement multiplied by the equity capitalization two days before announcement date 
in each sample year. 
 




The paper will try to study several firm and deal characteristics which may result low 
acquiring-firm abnormal return associated with large loss deals based on the researches. 
These characteristics are listed below:   
3.31 Firm Characteristics 
The means and the medians of firm characteristics will be investigated in the paper. 
1. Assets (book) 
Assets present the total value of the acquiring firm and decide firm’s scale. The operating 
cash flow and cash will be normalized by book value of assets in the paper. The market 
value of assets is also widely used in paper; for instance, the proportion calculated as deal 
value divided by market value of assets decides whether the acquisition is essential to the 
acquiring firm. 
2. Market Capitalization 
Market capitalization reflects the equity value of acquiring firm. It also reveals the 
influence of the acquirer on stock market. A firm with capitalization which exceeds the 
25𝑡ℎ percentile of NYSE firms will be defined as a large firm in the following analysis. 
3. Cash/assets（book） 
Cash which is normalized contains cash and marketable securities. The research by 
Harford (1999) shows that acquiring firms with large holdings of cash relate to lower 
abnormal return.  
4. Debt/assets (book) and Debt/assets (market) 




value of assets respectively. Here, market value of assets is defined as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus market value of equity. Maloney, McCormick, 
and Mitchell (1993) point out that the acquiring firms with low leverage have lower 
abnormal returns. 
5. Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q is a ratio revealing the market’s expectation of acquiring firm on investing in 
capital. In the paper, Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by the book value of the assets. The 
literatures hold different opinions on the relation between Tobin’s q and the abnormal 
return. 
6. BM(equity) 
The definition of Book-to-Market ratios of equity in this paper follows the definition 
proposed by Fama and French (1992, 1993). This ratio is used as one of the two proxies 
of overvaluation in research of Dong et al. (2003). The research stated that overvalued 
acquiring firms with low BM ratio have lower abnormal returns. 
7. OCF/assets (book) 
Operating cash flow is defined as sales minus the cost of goods, sales and general 
administration and working capital change, reflecting the operating profit of acquirer. 
Empirically, acquirers with low OCF have lower abnormal returns.  
3.32 Deal characteristics 




The transaction values (million dollars) in the paper are only the total acquisition values 
paid by acquirers without the fees and expenses. Study by Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 
(1983) stated that the relative size of the target to the bidder affected acquisition’s 
abnormal return.  
2. TV/assets (market) and TV/equity (market) 
After normalized by market value of the assets and the market value of the equity 
respectively, transaction values can measure the importance of the acquisition for 
acquiring firm and its shareholders. 
3. Days to completion 
The number of days counted from announcement date to completion or termination date 
is defined as the number of days to completion. 
4. Cash in payment (%) and Equity in payment (%) 
These two ratios are proportions of cash and of equity paid in the acquisitions which are 
completed by paying both cash and equity. Travlos (1987) suggests that the deals with 
higher percentage of equity payment have lower abnormal returns in acquisitions of 
public firms. 
6. Pure cash deal (%) and pure equity deal (%) 
The ratios are defined as the number of acquisition paid by cash only or equity only 
divided by the total number of sample acquisitions. Empirically, the pure equity deals 
have lower abnormal returns. 




The premiums in tender offers raise the costs of acquisitions for acquiring firms. The 
market probably has less confidence in acquirers to benefit from the acquisition because 
of higher costs. Empirically, tender offers in acquisitions lead to lower abnormal returns. 
9. Hostile deal (%) 
The proportions of hostile deals are listed in the paper. Most hostile deals have tough 
acquiring proceeds which have unexpected costs of acquisition in high probability. 
Acquisitions opposed by target management (Schwert (2000)) are proved to have lower 
abnormal returns.  
10. Private target (%) and Public target (%) 
The distributions of target ownership are also computed. Private targets seem not to 
matter abnormal returns, while public targets have negative effects on abnormal returns in 
studies of Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Chang (1998), respectively. 
11. Competed deal (%) 
The paper investigates the percentage of deals with actual competition. In research of 








4.1 Dollar and percentage acquisition returns    
Table 4.1 includes the yearly numbers and aggregate transaction values of acquisitions 
and shows the returns of acquiring-firm shareholders in recent technology merger wave. 
The aggregate transaction values and aggregate dollar returns are all in 2014 million 
dollar. The amount spent on acquisition in 2011 is the highest among five years. Then the 
cost in 2012 stayed almost the same level as that in 2010 followed by increases in next 
two years’ costs. Additionally, the sample numbers slightly decreased in 2013 and 2014, 
while the total numbers of acquisitions in these two years all increased as showed in 
Table 3.1.  
Table 4.1 
Full Sample Distribution of Aggregate Transaction Values, Dollar Returns, and 








Return CAR(+1, -1) 
2010 140 31,603 -49 -0.0058 
2011 138 49,084 35 -0.0018 
2012 134 30,706 -272 0.0238 
2013 105 40,412 35 0.0130 
2014 118 42,557 363 0.0114 




The aggregate dollar returns dramatically increased 635 million from 2012 to 2014, even 
though the sample transaction numbers in 2014 decreased 16 compared to the number in 
2012. On the other hand, dollar losses in different sample years changes sharply. The 
average dollar loss per acquisition in 2012 is 2.03 million, while the average dollar loss 
per acquisition in 2010 is 0.35 million, which means acquirer shareholders loss nearly 6 
times more per acquisition in 2012. Similarly, the average dollar gain per acquisition in 
2011 and 2013 is 0.29 million. The average dollar gain per acquisition in 2014 is 3.08 
million, which is over 10 times more. Furthermore, the dollar loss per $100 spent on 
acquisition is $0.15 in 2010 and $0.89 in 2012. The dollar gain per $100 spent on 
acquisition is $0.08 in 2011 and 2013, and $0.85 in 2012. The average dollar returns per 
acquisition and the average returns per dollar spent on acquisitions indicate that the 
hypothesis that the acquirer shareholders loss or gain more because of more acquisitions 
or larger acquisitions cannot be accepted. 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns both in 2010 and in 2011 are negative. Aggregate 
dollar return in 2010 is negative; however, aggregate dollar return in 2011 is positive. The 
highest positive mean cumulative abnormal return is in 2012, surprisingly with the 
biggest aggregate dollar loss. Additionally, mean cumulative abnormal returns in 2013 
and 2014 are positive and close, though their aggregate dollar gains are significantly 
different. 2014’s average CAR is more than 10 times 2013’s average CAR. These results 





4.2 Analysis of dollar and percentage acquisition returns 
Since dollar and percentage returns in 2011 and 2012 suggest opposite acquiring-firm 
shareholders’ wealth changes and yearly aggregate dollar returns in 2013 and 2014 
change a lot when the mean abnormal returns are similar, the appropriate statistical 
explanation for those results is that there are few acquisitions associated with extremely 
large dollar losses or gains in those years.  
Figure 4.1 
Box plot of the dollar return of acquiring-firm shareholders (2010 to2014) 
 
Figure 4.1 is the illustration of a box plot about distribution of dollar returns from 2010 to 
2014. There are more extremely large dollar losses or gains in 2011, 2012 and 2014. 




to in 2010 and 2013. In 2012, the increase in the frequency and magnitude of large dollar 
loss acquisitions is much over the increase in that of large gain acquisitions, which 
correspond to sharply increase of negative skewness in distribution of dollar returns. On 
the contrast, the increase in the frequency and magnitude of large dollar gain acquisitions 
are over the increase in large loss acquisitions in 2011 and 2014. The statistic explanation 
of above changes can be measured in skewness coefficients and percentiles of 
distribution presented in Table 4.2. The skewness coefficients in 2012, 2011, and 2014are 
-7.16, 5.61 and 4.20, which all are relatively high and have the same signs as aggregate 
dollar returns do. The table also shows the dollar losses or gains normalized by aggregate 
transaction value, which correspond to the samples with dollar losses or gains in 5𝑡ℎand 
95𝑡ℎ percentiles of the distribution of dollar returns. The results indicate that the trails in 
2011, 2012 and 2014 are not symmetric. 
Table 4.2 
The skewness coefficients and percentiles of distribution (2010-2014) 





2010 -3.61 -3% 1% 
2011 5.61 -2% 4% 
2012 -7.16 -30% 12% 
2013 3.77 -3% 5% 
2014 4.20 -5% 22% 
The unusual aggregate dollar losses result from increases in the amount of dollar losses in 




dollar gains result from increases in the amount of dollar gains in right tails. In order to 
analysis the unusual aggregate dollar returns, the paper will investigate the acquisitions 
with extremely large losses or gain which are assumed as deals with losses or gains 
exceeding 500 million in each sample year. Table 4.3 list the distribution and relative 
information of large loss and gain deals assorted by announcement year in two panels. 
Table 4.3 
Large Loss and Gain Deals Sample Distribution 







2010 4 2919 -4,759 
2011 0 0 0 
2012 5 8,660 -33,244 
2013 2 2,126 -2,653 
2014 2 4521 -9,527 
All 13 18,226 -50,183 







2010 0 0 0 
2011 4 5,517 6,876 
2012 6 906 10,613 
2013 2 201 4,367 
2014 8 11,592 35,220 
All 20 18,216 57,076 
During period from 2010 to 2014, there are 13 large loss deals and 20 large gain deals out 
of total 635 sample acquisition announcements. The number of large loss deals is 65% of 




loss deals and large gain deals. And the aggregate dollar loss is 88% of that of large gain 
deals. Year 2011 has no large loss deal but 4 large gain deals with total amount of 6876 
million, which means the acquiring-firm shareholders will loss 6841 million excluding 
these 4 acquisitions. Oppositely, the aggregate dollar return will be positive in 2012 
without large gain acquisitions. Therefore, few acquisitions with large losses or gains 
explain the disparities between percentage and dollar returns for acquirer shareholders in 
2011 and 2012.  
The losses or gains are dramatically large in extreme acquisitions considering the relative 
transaction values from 2010 to 2014. Every dollar acquiring-firm shareholders spent on 
large loss deals lost $2.75 averagely, while the median loss is 0.67 per dollar spent. 
Acquiring-firm shareholders gain $3.13 per dollar spent in large gain acquisitions, while 
the median gain is 0.85 per dollar spent. In researches, one of possible reasons that make 
bidder shareholders in large loss deals allow managements making acquisition decisions 
losing over $1 per dollar cost is that reassessments of future cash flows for bidders 
contribute to parts of losses (Moeller et al. (2005)). The studies by McCardle and 
Viswanathan (1994), and Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) confirm that firms with a sign 
of lacking internal growth opportunities will involve in these reassessments. Another 
explanation of the reassessment is the signaling of overpriced equity of firms that make 
equity offer (Travlos (1987)). Furthermore, these extreme acquisitions reflect the 
market’s opinions of bidder firms’ current business and operation including management, 




The large loss or gain deals clustered in years with unusual aggregate dollar returns did 
not distribute as sample acquisition did. Approximately 21% of total acquisitions 
occurred in 2011, as 38% large loss deals and 30% large gain deals took placed in the 
same year. Similarly, year 2014 has 19% total acquisitions, but 40% large gain deals. 
 
4.3 The statistical and economic significance of the large loss and gain deals  
This section will prove the statistical and economic significance of 13 large loss deals and 
20 large gain deals during period from 2010 to 2014 in three respects: stock volatility, 
benchmark and unrelated announcements.  
As the volatility of stock market in past five sample years is high, the unusual aggregate 
dollar returns for acquisitions may be caused by the frequent change of large firms’ large 
market capitalization resulting from market’s high volatility. The paper investigates 
validation of above hypothesis based on relative t-statistics which test whether three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in announcement event windows are significantly 
different from zero. The standard deviation in evaluation of test is computed by each firm’ 
time-series returns over estimation window, period (-205, -6). After evaluation, the paper 
finds out only 20 firms’ three-day CARs are insignificant. The average t-statistics for all 
acquisition announcements is 4.68, and the median is 2.65. Therefore, the paper does not 
accept the hypothesis. 
Then, Moeller et al. (2005) suggest that measurement of benchmark may lead to large 




are highly possible to affect the market return. However, dollar return can also be defined 
as product of the cumulative abnormal return in of each announcement multiplied by the 
equity capitalization two days before announcement date in each sample year, which 
means dollar return has been adjusted by market through abnormal return already. Further, 
sample dollar returns will not be affected by differences between industry returns, 
because all investigating acquisitions come from the same technology industry. 
Finally, unrelated news announcement may have effects on abnormal returns of extreme 
acquisitions. The paper examined the news of 33 unusual acquisitions in (-2, +2) day 
interval through Bloomberg News Search. Although some high-tech companies with 
large market capitalization create plenty news about their new products and technologies, 
those companies did not release these news around acquisition announcement date. The 
positive influence of this news on stock returns should be limited. And the research 
results show few number of them have negative unrelated announcement. Thus, related 
news announcements do have little effect on make unusual dollar returns. 
 
4.4 Analysis of firm and deal characteristics 
The paper will try to analysis whether firm and deal characteristics can explain abnormal 
returns of large loss and gain deals in technology industry from 2010 to 2014 or not. Two 
charts in this section include and compare the mean and median (in brackets) of deal and 
firm characteristics in extreme deals and other deals. The t-tests are used to calculate 




Table 4.4 focuses on deal characteristics. Large loss and gain deals have large absolute 
transaction values. But the transaction values of these extreme deals have similar 
proposition with those of other deals after normalized by acquirers’ market value of 
assets.  
Table 4.4 








 (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) 
Transaction Value 
(TV) 
1,363 877 210 486 1153 667 
 [772] [300] [52] [472] [720] [248] 
TV/assets (market) 0.126 0.0115 0.147 0.011 -0.019 -0.036 
  [0.075] [0.060] [0.089] [0.015] [-0.014] [-0.021] 
TV/equity (market) 0.197 0.223 0.361 -0.164 -0.026 -0.138 
 [0.101] [0.116] [0.150] [-0.015] [-0.049] [-0.034] 
Days to completion  87.5 53.6 57 7 3.6 -4 
 [65] [35] [60] [30] [5] [-25] 
Cash in payment 
(%) 
99.0 93.8 81.2 5.2 17.8 12.6 
Equity in payment 
(%) 
1.0 4.7 2.7 -3.7 -1.7 2 
Pure cash deal  
(%) 
84.6 85 76.8 -0.4 7.8 8.2 
Pure equity deal 
(%) 
7.7 0 5.7 7.7 2 -5.7 
Tender-offer  
(%)  
7.7 10 4.5 -2.3 3.2 5.5 
Private target 
(%) 
46.2 85 83.9 -38.8 -37.7 1.1 
Public target  
(%) 
53.8 15 15.6 38.8 38.2 -0.6 




acquisitions are so little that can be ignored. Cash is used much more often than equity 
anytime. This may result from the commonly rich cash flows in high-tech companies. 
Therefore, low abnormal returns of large loss deals will not be caused by equity finance 
as Moeller et al. (2004) noted. And cash payment cannot be a sufficient reason leading to 
large gain deals. 
Hostile and tender offers seem not to cause the unusual sample dollar returns either. The 
chart 4.4 does not show the proportion of hostile offer because there is no hostile deal 
according to available data of sample acquisitions. Then, the total number of tender offers 
in extreme acquisitions is very small. Slightly higher percentage of tender-offer of large 
loss deals compared to that of other deals are not strong enough to explain the low mean 
and median three-day abnormal return of large loss deals, -6.40% and -4.383%, 
respectively. Similarly, 10% tender offers in large gain deals are meaningless. 
Public targets are more likely to lead to low abnormal returns. The large loss deals have a 
high fraction of public target than other two types deals do. Large gain deals, on the other 
hand, are less likely to benefit from status of targets because the other deals and large 
gain deals’ distributions of targets’ status are almost the same. Additionally, competitions 
in acquisitions contribute merely for samples’ abnormal returns. There are only 4 
competed deals in other deals during five-year period. 
In Table 4.5, firm features are investigated. Obviously, acquirers in extreme deals 
compared to firms in other deals are large firms with high market capitalizations. Degrees 




average percentage of cash hold by firms should be the highest in firms with large loss 
and lowest in firms with large gain. However, firms with other deals have the highest 
ratio of cash holding.  
Table 4.5 








 (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) 
Assets (book) 105,214 54,914 8,247 50,300 96,967 46,667 
 [110,903] [30,316] [1,248] [80,587] [109,655] [29,068] 
Market capitalization 171,612 101,117 13,175 70,495 158,437 87,942 
 [158,920] [25,612] [2,041] [133,308] [156,879] [23,571] 
Cash/assets (book) 0.133 0.114 0.174 0.019 -0.041 -0.060 
 [0.141] [0.075] [0.154] [0.066] [-0.013] [-0.079] 
Debt/assets (book)  0.413 0.545 0.494 -0.132 -0.081 0.051 
 [0.557] [0.551] [0.479] [0.006] [0.078] [0.072] 
Debt/assets (market) 0.176 0.297 0.254 -0.121 -0.078 0.043 
 [0.152] [0.238] [0.227] [-0.086] [-0.075] [0.011] 
Tobin’s q 1.986 2.582 2.477 -0.596 -0.491 0.105 
 [2.250] [2.325] [1.979] [-0.075] [0.271] [0.346] 
𝐁𝐌(𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐭𝐲) 0.345 0.285 0.373 0.060 -0.028 -0.088 
 [0.260] [0.266] [0.310] [-0.006] [-0.050] [-0.044] 
OCF/assets (book) 0.070 0.061 0.038 0.009 0.032 0.023 
 [0.064] [0.063] [0.046] [0.001] [0.018] [0.017] 
Low leverages of firm in large loss deals offer a persuasive explanation for their low 
abnormal returns. And the relatively high leverages contribute to part of large gain deals’ 
high abnormal returns.  
Furthermore, the data proves the theories and hypothesis o that low Tobin’s q result low 




ratio of large loss deals may result from few extremely low Tobin’s q ratio. Because the 
median ratio of firms with large loss deals is significantly higher than that of firms made 
other deals. In addition, differences between ratios of large gain deals and other deals are 
small enough that these Tobin’s q ratio is unlikely to be a source of those large gains. 
BM ratios indicate completely opposite results with what the previous researches 
suggested. As the mean and median ratios do not differ with each other very much, the 
characteristic is useless to explain large differences between sample acquisitions’ unusual 
abnormal returns. 
Finally, operating cash flows have similar conflict with total cash holding. The firms with 
other deals instead of firms with large gain deals have the lowest average proportion of 
OCF. The firms with large loss deals have highest ratio indeed. Overall, the average 
levels of all firms’ OCF are low during sample period. 
Some factors are confusing and hard to decide their effects on the abnormal returns 
through comparison analysis, such as the degree of cash holding, Tobin’s q ratio 
and 𝐁𝐌(𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐭𝐲) ratio. Excluding these factors, the paper finds that public targets and low 
leverage are more likely to lead to low abnormal returns compared to other factors. No 
sufficient characteristic introduced in paper is found to be helpful to understand large 







The paper examined 635 samples of high-tech acquisitions to investigate the 
acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth changes during recent merger wave from 2010 to 
2014. Yearly aggregate dollar returns and average abnormal returns give opposite results 
of the acquirer shareholders’ wealth change in three years. The disparities between two 
measurements are caused by a small number of relative acquisitions with extremely large 
losses or gains. The percentage and dollar returns indicate similar acquiring-firm 
shareholders’ wealth changes without considering those large loss or gain deals over 500 
million, which consist only 3% of total samples and are statistically and economically 
significant.  
Despite popular and academic researches have proposed several firm and deal 
characteristics that will affect abnormal returns, the paper finds out those features can 
only explain very limited part of abnormal returns associated with large loss or gain deals 
in this paper, especially with large gain deals. Public targets and low leverage are the 
most possible characteristics to cause low abnormal returns based on analysis, while 
other features are meaningless or inconsistent with existing researches. 
The paper did not study synergistic gains which will transfer shareholders’ wealth from 
bidders to targets. Synergistic gains may also contribute to disparities between dollar and 
percentage returns. And there may be other factors leading to unusual dollar returns. 
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